The Bay of Pigs: A British foreign policy perspective.

“The revolutionary Government in 1960, whether because it wanted to or because it felt itself forced to, has concluded commercial agreements with the USSR, East Germany and Poland. Dilatoriness, inefficiency and pique in commercial relations with Western countries have at the same time tended to accentuate the swing to the left.”[1]

Herbert Marchant, British Ambassador to Cuba outlined in the annual review for 1960 a scathing critique regarding the domino effect of the breakdown in Western-Cuban political and commercial relations that later resulted in economic and military aid intervention from the Soviet Union.[2] The UK embassy in Havana provided a deep insight concerning Cuba’s internal political situation and it was clear the ambassador was not reserved in his judgement as he cautiously suggested that US intervention through over-reactionary economic sanctions had to a point influenced or forced Castro to seek Soviet assistance.

This direct Communist challenge to the Truman Doctrine was sourced as a clear outcome of conflict of interest between the US and Cuban administrations from 1959 to 1961 – notably that long standing US economic interests on the island were completely incompatible with Cuban state ownership of land and assets and the subsequent sanctions that came as a response were perhaps characteristic of the far-reaching historical trend of interventionism in Latin America. Sanctions and provocative diplomacy in turn justified economic intervention from the Soviet Union and paradoxically confirmed the American government’s greatest fears of Communism so local and within the Western Hemisphere. Most importantly the acquisition of Western land and assets via agrarian reform laws[3], poor diplomatic and trade relations, accusations of subversive activities[4], nationalisation of foreign companies[5], the prohibition of foreign land ownership and the shift in Cuban economic reliance from the US to the Soviet Union all led to a complete breakdown of American-Cuban foreign relations and the rise of close ties with the Soviet Union. [6]
Lawrence Freedman accurately summarised this deterioration noting that as Castro’s policies became more overtly Anti-American it became impossible to maintain cordial relations and seek any reconciliation. He well outlined the paradox that began the road to the missile crisis, by citing that the Eisenhower administration’s efforts to “…deflect the regime from communism only served to confirm it on its course”[7] This further supported Marchant’s on-the-ground analysis of the possibility that poor commercial relations might have pushed Castro to conclude Soviet trade contracts but also clarified the prior discussed Anglo-American divergence over the denial of arms trade with the Castro regime regarding whether a weapons embargo might provoke Cuba to seek assistance from the Soviet Union.[8] [9] As becomes self-evident in this chapter, common British critical parlance of American strategy rather than judgement highlighted fundamental disagreements within the alliance over the approach taken in stemming the Communist threat but always a background consideration remained that support and compliance within the special relationship carried mutual benefit to British foreign interests. ‘Convergence’ with American policy would take prominence until it interfered with the more integral aspects of British commercial relations or posed complications by the requirement of changes to legislation.[10] [11] Overseas trade was central to the economic survival of post-war Britain hence the spread of Communism and revolutionary ideas to areas where the UK still maintained commonwealth governance was a realistically perceived threat. However while the Anglo-American governments were in consensus that the ideological threat in the case of Cuba needed to be quelled by undermining Castro – Macmillan’s administration avoided deference to and full unity with American trade sanctions against Cuba as is best outlined in this chapter through British opposition to American pressure on imposing trade controls on the island.

The causation and responsibility for the relations breakdown and the resulting USSR intervention draws useful context surrounding the focal point of our study in this chapter; an examination of the extent to which the British government endorsed and supported US initiatives to undermine the Castro regime. Two key areas are covered: How far the British government supported the US backed Bay of Pigs operation and the degree to which the Macmillan government opposed extensive trade restrictions.

BRITAIN AND THE BAY OF PIGS

The decline of American and Cuban relations hit a turning point in March 1960 one month after trade ties had been formalised between Cuba and the Soviet Union. Eisenhower, in consensus with his administration endorsed the CIA to pursue covert action to remove the Castro regime. Just over a year later in April 1961, newly inaugurated President Kennedy authorized a CIA funded and militarily trained group of Cuban dissident exiles to launch a beach-head offensive at the Bahía de Cochinos (Bay of Pigs)[12][13] aimed at overthrowing Castro but was within three days quickly suppressed by the Cuban military.

The Macmillan government was fully supportive of the notion that Castro had to be removed even offering assistance before the plan had been fully developed or known of[14] - but recently published archival evidence suggests that the British position, while accepting US judgement as justified and mutually beneficial in aiming to remove the local communist threat was perhaps originally far more critical of the strategic approach taken in its aftermath. While Macmillan was prepared to but did not aid the intelligence campaign to remove Castro he was also mindful of the deeply unpopular public sentiment held at home regarding the underhand British involvement in the Suez Crisis and as Scott noted “American involvement raised parallels with Britain’s behaviour at Suez six years earlier”[15]. Macmillan avoided any scrutiny that his administration supported the CIA funded incident, as scandal soon erupted in the world’s media of American association in the planning and execution of Operation Zapata. Public awareness of British support could prove catastrophic for the government given the similarities to the Suez crisis but it would also demonstrate a contradiction to the precedent set in the wind of change speech – that Britain no longer intervened globally as an imperial power but rather promoted individualism and self-governance in the post-colonial world. Cautiously Macmillan balanced the greater need to maintain cohesiveness in the special relationship while evading any political threat to his administration through pre-emptively resisting foreseen scrutiny in Parliament.

The Cabinet were informed that, according to the latest information from Washington, the attempt to overthrow the Castro regime in Cuba had failed. The situation in Cuba was to be discussed that day in the Political Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, where four resolutions were tabled. We had agreed with the United States Government to vote in favour of a resolution put forward by a group of Latin American countries recommending that the whole matter be referred to the Organisation of American States. In the House of Commons that afternoon the Opposition were likely to try to adjourn the House for discussion of the Cuban situation; but the current proceedings in the United Nations should afford sufficient ground for resisting such a motion.[16]

The political stakes were high: Kennedy’s reputation took a heavy blow after confirming American involvement[17] and it was clear Macmillan had taken careful measures to evade suffering the same fate. On the possibility of American intervention, the shadow Foreign Secretary Dennis Healey’s remarks highlighted the political risks Macmillan was taking by unofficially supporting the plan to overthrow Castro that Eisenhower had initiated.[18]

The British administration fully supported the objective to remove Castro: in part out of a requirement to adhere to and maintain the special relationship, bearing concern of the Soviet threat posed to the balance of power in the Western hemisphere, but also out of a genuine fear that Cuba could fulfil the role of a valuable and influential launching pad of revolutionary or communistic ideas that could be exported to British colonies in the region.[19] This devotion to American judgement despite the failure at the Bay of Pigs is as we have outlined very well buttressed by the political risks Macmillan took in doing so, but critique of the strategy was like Marchant’s analysis of the breakdown in relations completely unreserved.

Documents released by the National Archives in 2002 highlighted a scathing Foreign Office analysis of the failures of the CIA in the planning and execution of operation Zapata. This Reuters news article illuminated the salient criticisms held within the Foreign Office regarding the ineptness of the operation notably deriding the ‘intense internal jealousies’ within the CIA and lack of communication from Eisenhower to Macmillan regarding planning of strategies to undermine Castro. Correspondence between Foreign Office official H. Hankey and Macmillan’s private secretary, following a brief from the American establishment, draws attention to British critical parlance of US strategy in ousting Castro, positing that the British government was left in the dark over planning and unable to contribute to it.

The intelligence failure of the CIA appears explicable only on the assumption of intense internal jealousies…The Department of Defence also seems to have failed to consider the most elementary point – where to invade….They really could hardly have chosen a worse point.[20]

However the American government was just as critical as the British, as Kennedy soon shifted the blame of failure to the CIA and made strident attempts to recover his reputation by taking a tougher stance on communism.[21] Nevertheless while there was full support of American judgement to go ahead with subversive operations to remove Castro, Macmillan was said to be irritated with Eisenhower’s obscurity of the plan which was made clear in a letter to the President "It would...make it easier for us to help if we had a rather clearer understanding of your actual intentions…I am not very clear how you really mean to achieve this aim."[22] Critique of the lack of information and the poor strategy taken pre and post Zapata draws familiar attention to Anglo-American disagreements over economic sanctions and the foresight that such a strategy to undermine Castro might promote and justify closer relations to the Soviet Union. Such a awareness of a more rational and grounded British understanding of the political situation in Cuba and a cautious attentiveness of the possible consequences of over-reactionary economic sanctions or in this case, indirect intervention, is best highlighted in a memo from the British Ambassador to the United States in 1960 warning that “The greatest danger, which must be avoided at all costs, is an unsuccessful operation that would leave Castro in power but more embittered than ever.”[23]
The accuracy of Foreign Office ‘prophesizing’ regarding the closer ties within the Cuban-Soviet relationship , in part provoked by tough economic sanctions and indirect CIA intervention, was perhaps reflective of historic experience in observation of the internal political situation of overseas colonies, caution of the ineffectiveness proven by economic sanctions at Suez and perhaps most importantly while the American government withdrew diplomatic ambassadors from Cuba in January 1961 the British foreign office continued observation in Havana as evidenced in the continuing detailed embassy reports.

It is self-evident that the UK government was in full support of Zapata despite the high political risk taken in doing so. Notwithstanding devotion to American judgement, the retrospective disagreements over strategy are very well clear in the cutting British critique of the CIA, frustration over the lack of clarity in planning and American avoidance of the grounded British perspective of how provocative economic and interventionist strategies could backfire. Macmillan had stated a year prior to the fiasco that the “strategic implications are even more important than the economic.”[24] and so he justified his support of Eisenhower’s decision to undermine Castro; but British scrutiny regarding the methods to do so, despite rational analysis, was generally ignored. Frustration soon shifted to opposition as economic impositions proposed by Kennedy to NATO the following year threatened British freedoms in overseas trade.

OPPOSITION TO EXCESSIVE TRADE RESTRICTIONS

[I] strongly disagreed with the whole idea of COCOM. If you refused to sell things to Communist or other countries they soon learned how to make the items themselves. The whole idea was ridiculous in itself and particularly to a country like the United Kingdom, 40 per cent of whose gross national product was accounted for by overseas trade. The comparable figure for the United States was 6 per cent.[25]

In June 1962 Macmillan affirmed to Secretary of State Dean Rusk his longstanding opposition to the CoCom list[26] [27], the application of Cuba to its restrictions and the effectiveness of its control of exports that aimed to curtail Soviet bloc states abilities to procure or develop arms. The real concern of the UK government was made obvious by the Prime Minister – the lynchpin of the British economy remained overseas trade and agreement to extensive sanctions on goods that ‘could’ be utilised in the development of arms was excessive and perhaps damaging to British economic interests. [28] Such opposition was frequently justified on the pretence of rational scepticism that economic sanctions were ineffective and encouraged Soviet subsidizing in Cuba. The political and economic risks were obvious: At worst, broad concessions would express weakness of foreign policy – pursuing American objectives over British self-interest and could set standard that the lifeblood of the UK economy would be distantly controlled from Washington. At best, Britain had already imposed a weapons embargo on Cuba and further restrictions on trade would back-peddle the earlier policy of avoiding economic sanctions and maintaining good commercial relations with the island.

Kennedy increased his efforts to depose Castro[29] (in part as an attempt to recover from the failure of the Bay of Pigs) by lobbying NATO allies to agree to further economic controls, such as reporting credit given or loaned to the island (usually payment for imports). Similar to those measures imposed on the Soviet Union and its satellite states; later throughout the year Kennedy would follow a hard-line by repeatedly issuing requests to NATO for Cuba to be subject to CoCom embargo.[30] This was met with direct opposition from the British government.[31] The lighter ‘credit reporting’ controls were already accepted by NATO members and the Foreign Secretary agreed with reluctance that British endorsement would not create significant difficulties in its implementation[32] given that the conditions proposed would have little impact on trade: an arms embargo had been in place and the measures only went as far as observation and reporting. Subsequent disagreement within the Cabinet was expressed best by the President of the Board of Trade Frederick Erroll.[33] His opposition alluded to fears that if the British government conceded to updating NATO with Anglo-Cuban credit reports and observations of exports (particularly of strategic goods; and more importantly transhipments of restricted Soviet goods or arms to Cuba) shipped from or via Britain this could later justify “…an argument in favour of more active measures such as the restriction of credit, the prohibition of exports of goods containing strategic goods and the prohibition of exports of goods containing United States components”[34] Despite his opposition being overruled by majority opinion in the Cabinet, it highlighted real concern that excessive concessions to American promoted Cuban trade restrictions would not only threaten the benefits gained through trade with the Island, but on a wider scale hinge on subjugating UK commercial relations with other Communist countries. Such a feeling was echoed by Macmillan (as was expressed in his opposition to CoCom) and the risks to British freedom in trade were well understood by the Foreign Secretary. This contributed to the decision that while Britain had a duty to maintain a level of accord in the special relationship and unanimity with international alliances; the ‘reporting and observing’ conditions proposed were accepted in respect of unity but bearing assertions that economic sanctions were believed ineffective, provoked further tension and that British trade relations would not be subject to excessively American influenced policy. [35]

Kennedy’s suspicions of Soviet arms shipments to Cuba increased greatly over the summer of 1962. On the 13^th September, Kennedy warned the Soviet Union of his intention to take pre-emptive action if the Soviets shipped offensive weapons to Cuba that could pose a danger to US national security.[36] At the same time he continued to press his NATO allies to ensure none of the ships passing from or via their ports to Cuba contained any arms shipments or strategic goods. Noted clearly in a Cabinet meeting on the 9^th October, such a hard-line stance was initially perceived as disproportionate and objected to in principle by Foreign Secretary Home however in light of the fearful public feeling in the US regarding Soviet arms build-up in Cuba the British government took steps to accommodate American pressure by appealing to ship owners to refrain from carriage of arms. The British government, while oppositional to the excessive trade sanctions posed by Kennedy, was still in October, in the process of developing policy to reach an amicable position with the American government.[37] - A much more pressing issue over shadowed Anglo-American disagreements over trade with Cuba in the following weeks.

[1] The National Archives, British Embassy in Havana Annual Review for 1960
FO 371/148181

[2] Richard. E. Welch, Response to Revolution, (Chapel Hill, NC, 1985) pp 4 – 7 – The following provides – based on research from the referenced publication a brief summary of the key factors we identified as leading to a breakdown in US-Cuban relations: The deterioration from the Cuban perspective took place over a wide array of issues: US critique of the execution of Batista supporters soured diplomatic relations. Castro’s denunciation of American aid to the previous dictatorship and his subsequent nationalisation of the US owned Cuban Telephone company further reinforced Anti-Americanism and sharpened the rift; providing foresight of the wide-scale nationalisation that was to follow. A state run National Institute of Agrarian Reform was established re distributing land in the form of nationalised agricultural co-operatives. By January 1960 a Cuban-American relations nose dive began as the US denounced the Castro regime for ‘conspiratorial encouragement of bombing raids by Cuban refugees’ which was followed by an invitation of Soviet First Deputy premier Anastas Mikolyan to open a Soviet trade exhibition in Havana.

[3] http://www.economywatch.com/agrarian/law/1959.html

[4] National Archives FO 371/139493 From Havana to Foreign Office

“Four unidentified aircraft alleged to have come from the United States carried out leaflet raids over Havana yesterday evening, dropping copies of an appeal to the Cuban people signed by Diaz Lanz ex-Chief of the Air Force in which he called on Castro to eliminate Communist influence from his government. Aircraft were met by sporadic ground fire. Following the raid some grenades were thrown and shots fired from cars in central Havana. According to the press, two people were killed and forty injured. The raid and yesterdays events in Camaguey caused some tension, but today Havana has returned to normal. Fidel Castro is due to deliver another television address this evening….
In his television appearances last night and this morning Castro repeatedly blamed the United States for permitting aircraft based on American territory to bomb and machine gun Cuban cities. It is true that on two occasions, unidentified aircraft have dropped what may have been bombs in the provinces, causing little damage and no casualties.”

[5] Scott, Macmillan p 19 – “Economic ownership was vital to agrarian reforms, which was pivotal to the revolution. The extent of American domination of Cuban agriculture, however, meant that any public ownership of the means of production inevitably invited conflict with the United States."

[6] Welch, Response to Revolution pp 4 – 7 The following demonstrates our research based on the referenced publication on what the key factors were that contributed to closer Cuban-Soviet ties: 13^th of February 1960 saw the signing of trade and economic aid agreements between the Soviet Union and Cuba, significantly the USSR agreed to purchase one million tonnes of Cuban sugar over five years, extending $100 million credits for the purchase of industrial equipment. On the 4^th of March, French ship La Coubre while unloading Belgian munitions exploded in Havana. Castro blamed the CIA, two months later Soviet-Cuban diplomatic relations were formally re-established. In July 1960 the Eisenhower administration in response cancelled the balance of Cuba’s sugar quota (largest export) and Khrushchev responded by substituting this by a promise to purchase an equal amount. A further series of tit-for-tat moves lead to full embargo of US exports bar medical and food supplies in late 1960: most prominent of which the nationalisation of US owned oil companies in Cuba following an American government order to deny processing Russian petroleum imports, the Declaration of Havana whereby Castro denied Soviet interventionism was taking place but simultaneously announced the promotion of Cuban-Soviet trade ties, Castro’s strong criticism of the US at a UN general assembly and further arms trade with communist countries. This was followed by the previously described embargo and by the end of 1960 Cuba had endorsed full support of Soviet Union foreign policy.’ –

[7] Freedman, Kennedys Wars p 123

[8] The National Archives, FO 371/148181

[9] Quoted in Scott, Macmillan “Lloyd informed Herter [Secretary of State] that: ‘if we in the Western world continue to give the impression that we are implacably imposed to the present regime in Cuba and that we will do nothing to help the Cubans so long as Castro is there, we may drive them more and more into the arms of Communists politically and economically.” p 18

[10] Note: While the British government was in agreement that the elements of communism in Cuba were becoming increasingly problematic and needed to be tackled, views on strategy to do so differed greatly: ideas regarding economic sanctions were not paralleled with American strategy – the British ambassador in Havana stated in early 1960 that “American intervention or economic reprisal could be disastrous for Cuba, but it would also provide an invaluable weapon for the communists.” (Scott, Macmillan, p 19) Scott attributes yet does not expand on the motivation for divergence over economic sanctions: he mentions that British views on Castro were more sanguine [than the Americans] and while there was fear of the spread of communism to British colonies the UK held a view different view of its effect on third world countries and how to deal with it than its American counterparts. While it was beneficial for the British to side with the US on removing Castro when his links became well established with the Soviet Union; disagreements over economic sanctions in undermining Castro were perhaps characteristic of Foreign Office ‘doublespeak’ assertions to the Americans that British commercial policy would not be controlled by US opposition to antithetical ideology. The context of which entrenched in dependence on the Marshall Plan and American pressured economic restriction over British and NATO member state trade with the Soviet Union. While the British language of [the wind of] change in the climate of decolonisation shifted away from Imperialism to promotion of self-direction, the feeling of which perhaps indirectly placed Britain under this umbrella with America – that in the view of freedom of trade the UK would do so through a degree of self-governance despite economic dependence on the United States. Opposition to sanctions against Cuba then reflected the precedent set in ‘defence of trade’ as changing stance to accommodate the US position fully would weaken the more integral aspects of British commercial relations. The subtle assertion was subsequently repeated later in opposition to the application of Cuba to the CoCom controls and was reinforced in the British perception that sanctions had seemed futile in stopping the nationalisation of British assets by Nasser that led to the Suez crisis.

[11] Cited in Scott, Macmillan p 20 Macmillan’s memoir on his doubts regarding the effectiveness of economic sanctions and the legal issues of stopping independent British ships from transporting Soviet oil to Cuba. This clarifies well an acceptance of American judgement but disagreement on strategy.
“Eisenhower could now only rely on economic pressure, in which he urged us to join, to rally the Cuban people against their new oppressors. While accepting the President’s analysis, I expressed doubts as to whether economic hardship would encourage opposition to Castro, especially if it could be blamed on the Americans and mitigated by Russian help. Nor could I agree to operate any blockade, whether of tankers or others ships. In peace time, we had no legal power to prevent tankers taking Russian oil to Cuba.”

[12] Note: Also referred to in this section as CIA’s Operation Zapata.

[13] http://www.lexisnexis.com/documents/academic/upa_cis/3029_cfcubaforaff1960-1963.pdf

[14] Drawn from Scott p p 20 - 21: Correspondence between Eisenhower and Macmillan in 1960: Following the decision to authorise the CIA to devise a programme of covert action against the Castro regime Macmillan replies with ‘robust support’ although withdrawn on British involvement in economic sanctions – he states “Castro is really the very devil. He is your Nasser, and of course with Cuba sitting right on your doorstep, the strategic implications are even more important than the economic. I fully understand your apprehension. He later writes “I feel sure Castro has to be got rid of, but it is a tricky operation for you to contrive, and I only hope you will succeed.”

Note: Eisenhower had not made clear how he planned to create the conditions that would remove Castro yet the British government was nevertheless fully supportive of the judgement taken that Castro should be removed – although withdrawn on the disagreement over economic sanctions – ‘deniable’ intervention was agreed on.

[15] Scott, Macmillan p 22

[16] The National Archives, Cabinet Minuets 20^th April 1961
CAB/128/35

[17] http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/april/17/newsid_3394000/3394067.stm

[18] Quoted in Scott, Macmillan p 23
…that many friends it has won throughout the world by its vigorous policies in many fields would be deeply dismayed if it turned out that the United States Administration were smudging this image by the illegitimate use of violence to solve political problems all to reminiscent of the precedent set by Her Majesty’s Government at Suez.

[19] http://www.csupomona.edu/~jmvadi/454/The%20Cold%20War.html

[20] http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/bay-of-pigs/jealousies.htm

[21] National Archives, Harold Caccia to Home
FO 371/156145
“…this early set-back will have a profound effect on the President. He will understandably be on the look-out for a chance to get even with the Communists, though with Mr Rusk at his elbow, he is unlikely to act irresponsibly. He will redouble his efforts to bring the wayward American government machine under control and in the process there will be a shift of power within the government and a modification of the President’s hitherto essentially personal direction of affairs.”

[22] http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/bay-of-pigs/jealousies.htm

[23] Ibid

[24] Quoted in Scott, Macmillan, p 20

[25] Quoted in Scott, Macmillan, p 26

[26] Note: Reluctance of British support of American pressure to place wide-scale arms trade embargos on the Soviet bloc had existed since the end of the Second World War. Britain amongst other European nations pursued trade with the eastern bloc while also attempting to placate perceived American indiscretions at export of munitions and/or components useful for military application to the Soviet Union. See Frank M. Cain, ‘British Responses to the USA’s Establishment of COCOM, 1947-51 Journal of Contemporary History, Vol 29. No3 (1994) pp 501 -522

[27] http://www.scribd.com/doc/19647291/CoCom-Lists-1962 - Goods barred in trade with Soviet bloc and China.

[28] Note: Although relevant but not central to our study in this chapter Kennedy’s CIA devised ‘Operation Mongoose’ – (intelligence operations aimed at sabotage of infrastructure and efforts to oust or assassinate Castro) – had been alleged, but not proven beyond conspiracy, to have targeted and sabotaged British shipments of Leyland buses to Cuba, as some of the machine components could be utilised for military purposes. See http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b00jcgxk

[29] Note: The US president embargoed all non-medical goods to Cuba in February 1962 and had already endorsed Operation Mongoose in 1961.

[30] Note: While all of the restricted goods within CoCom controls specifically focus on those that could aid a war-effort – many components listed were also essential in domestic applications. Leyland ltd. Sold 400 heavy busses to Cuba 1964 and although this is sometime after America imposed the embargo; the disagreement with the British over trade provides a useful example of an on-going divergence in Anglo-American trade policy to Cuba. Responding to American opposition, the managing director of Leyland retorted “…this is an English company doing a deal with Cuba. I have no knowledge of having to go to America for permission to sell buses." See http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,875588,00.html#ixzz0kRtfGR9p NATO ambivalence and in particular British opposition, was then not surprising considering the complications and limits it would pose on trade and profit.

[31] The National Archives, Cabinet Minutes
CAB /128/36 – 26^th June 1962
2. The President of the Board of Trade said that the United States Government had sought the support of the other members of the North Atlantic Alliance for drastic measures to restrict trade with Cuba. It had become clear that most members of the Alliance would accept the continuance of the existing embargo on the supply of arms to Cuba but in other respects would not be prepared to go as far as the United States Government had originally proposed…a report submitted to the North Atlantic Council by the Committee of Political Advisors…recommended that member countries should report to the Secretariat the amount of credit and credit guarantees given to Cuba; that member countries should keep their exports to Cuba under review so that the possibility of controlling the movement of strategic goods could be considered; and that, if there were signs that the United States goods were being trans-shipped to Cuba on a significant scale, means of controlling such trans-shipment should be further studied.

[32] Ibid: The Foreign Secretary said that the members of the North Atlantic Alliance already reported to the Secretariat the grant of credits to countries of the Communist bloc and he saw no great objection to extending this system to Cuba. The United States Government felt strongly about Cuba and, since the measures recommended were not in themselves important, he would prefer that we should not oppose them.

[33] Ibid [Erroll]
“The continuance of the arms embargo would present no difficulty for the United Kingdom Government, but there seemed to be no great value in the other arrangements proposed and there was a danger that, if these were accepted, the Government would appear to be reversing their stated policy of not taking economic measures against Cuba.
Moreover, acceptance of these arrangements might be used at a later stage as an argument in favour of more active measures such as the restriction of credit, the prohibition or restriction of the export of strategic goods and the prohibition of exports of goods containing United States components. With these considerations in mind, he suggested that the United Kingdom representative of the North Atlantic Council should oppose the adoption of the report of the Committee of Political advisors.

[34] Ibid

[35] Ibid -
At the same time the United States Government should be left in no doubt that in the accepting these recommendations on Cuba the United Kingdom Government were not acquiescing in the view of the United States Administration about the undesirability of trading with Communist countries. We should affirm our belief that measures to restrain trade with Communist countries would have the effect of exacerbating relations between East and West and driving the Communist countries to make themselves more self-sufficient. This opportunity should also be taken to urge the United States government to show, in the application of their trade policies, more consideration for legitimate British interests.

[36] http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=old&doc=94
President Kennedy "If at any time the Communist build-up in Cuba were to endanger or interfere with our security in any way . . . or if Cuba should ever . . . become an offensive military base of significant capacity for the Soviet Union, then this country will do whatever must be done to protect its own security and that of its allies."

[37] The National Archives, Cabinet Minutes
CAB 128/36 Oct 1962
The Foreign Secretary: This intensity of public feeling in the United States made it desirable to restrain our reaction to the attempt to restrict the supply of arms to Cuba by denying access to United States ports to ships engaged in this traffic. It would of course be necessary to maintain objection in principle to the action which the United States Administration had taken, but beyond that he hoped that for the time being we could confine ourselves to discussions with the United States authorities to establish exactly what they had in mind and to consider in the light of those discussions how best to minimise its effect on our trade. As a separate issue it might be necessary to consider legislation to prevent the carriage of such arms in United Kingdom ships; it was at least conceivable that the Russians might deliberately ship arms to Cuba in United Kingdom ships under charter.